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LIENS-PRIORITY OF COMMON LAW LIENS
AND SECURED INTERESTS IN WEST
VIRGINIA
When the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted by the
West Virginia legislature in 1963, the traditionally favored position
in law of the laborer, artisan, and repairman was perpetuated in
the priority of liens section of the Secured Transactions article.,
However, where the lien is statutorily created and the statute ex-
pressly provides for the lien's subordination to previously perfected
security interests, the priority of liens section creates an exception
to the preference for repairman's liens. In a recent case, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals construed the application of
this section to repairman's liens2 and held that the state's statutory
improver's lien3 "wholly supplanted" the common law repairman's
lien, thus bringing the lien of a repairman within the subordinated
category of liens in the Uniform Commercial Code.4 This decision
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-310 (1966).
2 Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving and Storage Co., 217 S.E.2d 907 (W.
Va. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Fruehaufl. A secured seller of a trailer brought suit
seeking possession of the trailer or judgment for its value from an improver and the
purchaser of the trailer at a distress sale conducted to satisfy the improver's posses-
sory lien. This case was initially discussed in Survey of Developments in West
Virginia Law: 1975-1976, 78 W. VA. L. Rsv. 537, 618 (1976).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-1 et seq. (1966). The section which creates the
improver's lien, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-3 (1966), states:
A person who, while in possession thereof, makes, alters, repairs,
stores, transports, or in any way enhances the value of an article of per-
sonal property . . . shall have a lien upon such article or animal while
lawfully in the possession thereof....
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-310 (1966) declares the priority of the lien of persons
furnishing services or materials with respect to goods in their possession. Whether
such a lien is based upon common law or statute, § 46-9-310 gives it priority, with
one exception, over a pre-existing security interest in the goods. The exception
relates to a lien created by statute which expressly provides subordination of the
lien.
West Virginia's statutory improver's lien, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-1 et seq.
(1966), expressly subordinates the lien to previous secured parties. W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 38-11-2 (1966) states:
Any lienor shall take such rights as a purchaser of the property
deposited with him would take, and shall take subject to other titles,
interests, liens or charges in the same manner that a purchaser would
take. . ..
The Fruehauf court, by declaring that common law repairman's liens no longer
existed, gave priority to the security interest by operation of the exception in § 46.
9-310 and the express subordination provision in § 38-11-2.
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represents an erosion of the favored legal position of the repairman,
the artisan, and the laborer.
West Virginia first recognized the common law repairman's
lien in the early decision of Burrough v. Ely.' At common law, a
person who furnished services and materials on a chattel at the
request of the owner acquired a lien for the value of such services
and materials.' However, the lien gave no right of sale, and the
repairman only had the right to retain possession of the property
until he was paid.' Surrender of possession destroyed the lien be-
cause there was no right to retrieve the chattel once it was re-
leased."
The only statutory enactment concerning the common law
repairman's lien authorized the use of "distress" by one holding
the lien.' Usually a landlord's remedy, distress allowed one claim-
ing a common law repairman's lien to take possession of the chattel
from the hands of the debtor. This statute strengthened the posses-
sory rights of the repairman.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, as noted in Fruehauf,5 later
acknowledged this broadening of the common law repairman's
lien." Subsequently, the court held that although the statute
"provide[d] a cumulative remedy for enforcing . . . [the
common-law repairman's lien], [the statute did] not abrogate or
change his common law right [of possession]."' 2
With the general recodification of all state statutes in 1930,
the legislature enacted a statute entitled "Miscellaneous Liens and
Pledges" which provided a lien for an improver of personal prop-
erty "while lawfully in possession thereof."'" Unlike the common
54 W. Va. 118, 46 S.E. 371 (1903). See also, Commercial Credit v. Oakley,
103 W. Va. 270, 137 S.E. 13 (1927); Waddell v. Trowbridge, 94 W. Va. 482, 119 S.E.
290 (1923); Scott v. Mercer Garage and Auto Sales Co., 88 W. Va. 92, 106 S.E. 425
(1921); and Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Close, 81 W. Va. 205, 94 S.E. 132 (1917).
6 Burrough v. Ely, 54 W. Va. 118, 46 S.E. 371 (1903).
7Id.
8Id. See also 1 L. JONES ON LIENS § 731 (3d ed. 1914).
Acts of the 29th W. Va. Leg. ch. 43, Reg. Sess. (1909).
I' 217 S.E.2d at 911.
Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Close, 81 W. Va. 205, 94 S.E. 132 (1917).
'2 Stallard v. Stepp, 91 W. Va. 60, 64, 112 S.E. 184, 186 (1922).
'3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-1 et seq. (1966). See notes 1 and 3 supra. The
revisor's note under this statute in the 1931 Code states that its principal effect is
in accord with the view expressed in the case of Waddell v. Trowbridge, 94 W. Va.
2
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law repairman's lien of possession, the statute allowed the im-
prover to sell the personal property by auction should the benefici-
ary of his services or material fail to pay.'" The statute neither
expressly repealed nor even mentioned the common law repair-
man's lien but stated instead that the section allowing sale by
auction did not preclude any other remedies allowed by law for the
enforcement of a lien or pledge against personal property.'
The section granting the use of other remedies available by
law is seemingly a codification of the court's decision in Stallard
v. Stepp,'" in that the legislature authorized a cumulative remedy
-sale by auction-but in enacting the statutory improver's lien,
did not abrogate or change the common law repairman's lien.
Indeed, the court held in two decisions after the enactment of the
statutory improver's lien that the common law repairman's lien
was still in effect, giving to a repairman a lien for labor performed
or material furnished by him in manufacturing or repairing goods
delivered to him for that purpose and entitling him to retain pos-
session of the property against the owner until the lien was dis-
charged by payment. 7
The West Virginia Constitution gives the legislature the power
to alter or repudiate the common law.'8 In determining whether the
statutory improver's lien replaced the common law repairman's
lien, the Fruehauf court stated that "the common law is not to be
deemed altered or abrogated by statute unless the Legislature's
intent to do so be plainly manifested."' 9 The principle case upon
which the court relied for this rationale stated that an "ancient
rule of the common law, based upon reason and supposed necessity
482, 119 S.E. 290 (1923), which mentioned the common law repairman's lien only
in requiring that a chattel be left for repairs by the owner or his agent, not a bailee,
for the lien to be effective. This case does not discuss priority of liens.
, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-14 (1966) states:
The lienor or pledges shall give written notice to the person on whose
account the goods are held. . . . In accordance with the terms of a notice
or given, a sale of the goods by auction may be had to satisfy any valid
claim of the lienor or pledgee for which he has a lien or pledge on the
goods. ...
Is W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-16 (1966).
91 W. Va. 60, 112 S.E. 184 (1922).
17 Kap-Tex, Inc. v. Romans, 136 W. Va. 489, 67 S.E.2d 847 (1951); Wellman
v. Holston Hardwood Co., 110 W. Va. 544, 159 S.E. 561 (1931).
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13.
" 217 S.E.2d at 911.
[Vol. 79
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: . . should not be cast aside unless the legislative intent to do so
is clearly manifested.
'20
The Supreme Court of Appeals had previously enunciated
principles concerning statutorily supplanting the common law.
First, a fundamental and time honored principle of the common
law is not to be deemed uprooted by mere implication'.2 Second,
where the common law on a given subject has not been expressly
repealed, displaced or altered, it remains in force.2 Third, when
statutes are in derogation of the common law, as the court in
Fruehauf held the statutory improver's lien to be, they are to be
strictly construed and should not be enlarged in their operation by
a construction beyond what their terms express.2
In determining whether the statutory improver's lien sup-
planted the common law, the court in Fruehauf stated the general
rule to be that:
[A] lien provided for by a statute which is merely declara-
tory of the common law must be interpreted in conformity with
its principles, but where the legislature has enlarged and de-
fined a common-law lien, its definition supercedes [that] of
the courts, and thereafter the exercise of the powers of the
courts with respect to such liens must be consistent with the
legislative definition.
24
A further reading of the source upon which the court relied
reveals that common law liens are not generally considered abol-
ished by a statute which merely enlarges upon such liens 5.2 This
source also adds that common law and statutory liens may exist
together and operate in aid of each other. 6 Accordingly, numerous
jurisdictions have held that the common law repairman's liens
Shiffilette v. Lilly, 130 W. Va. 297, 304, 43 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1947) (emphasis
added).
21 Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 190, 179 S.E. 604, 606 (1935).
" Harper v. Building Ass'n, 55 W. Va. 149, 46 S.E. 817 (1904).
23 Shiffiette v. Lilly, 130 W. Va. 297, 303, 43 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1947).
2, 217 S.E.2d at 911, citing 51 AM. JUR. 2d Liens § 38 (1970). There are only
two jurisdictions cited in this section for this "general rule." Akers v. Akers, 233
Minn. 133, 46 N.W.2d 87 (1951); Robinson v. Rogers, 237 N.Y. 467, 143 N.E. 647
(1924).
2 51 Am. JUR. 2d Liens § 36 (1970), citing Jackson v. Kusmer, 411 S.W.2d 257
(Mo. 1967).
1 51 AM. JUR. 2d Liens § 20 (1970), citing Hiltz v. Gould, 99 N.H. 85, 105 A.2d
48 (1947).
4
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survive enactment of statutory repairman's liensl and that a re-
pairman should be able to rely on the common law lien even
though he has not complied with statutory requirements or formal-
ities.Y8
The Fruehauf court failed to mention that the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia has held
the provisions of the statutory improver's lien which provide for
sale by auction to be in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment." Since the Supreme Court of Appeals has
held that once a statute declaratory of the common law is repealed
the area of the common law is restored as before,3" it logically
follows that the common law repairman's lien should have been
revived when the statutory improver's lien was declared unconsti-
tutional. This seems especially true since it was the right of sale
which violated the due process provisions, a right that did not exist
at common law.
The clearest statement of intent of the West Virginia legisla-
ture concerning the existence of the common law repairman's lien
" Gale and Co. v. Hooper, 323 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. App. 1959), aff'd 330 S.W.2d
826 (Mo. 1959); North End Auto Park, Inc. v. Petringa Trucking Co., Inc., 337
Mass. 618, 150 N.E.2d 735 (1958); Hiltz v. Gould, 99 N.H. 85, 105 A.2d 48 (1954);
Braufmann v. Hart Publication, 234 Minn. 343, 48 N.W.2d 546 (1951); Williamson
v. Winningham, 199 Okla. 393, 186 P.2d 644 (1947); Gruisin v. Stutz Motor Car Co.
of Am., 206 Ind. 296, 187 N.E. 382 (1933); Crosby v. Hill, 121 Me. 432, 117 A. 585
(1922); City Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls v. Laughlin, 210 S.W. 617 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919); Towle v. Raymond, 58 N.H. 64 (1877).
21 Slebbins v. Balfor, 157 Minn. 135, 195 N.W. 773 (1923); Bardasch v. Kalish,
118 Misc. 119, 193 N.Y. Supp. 719 (1922); Johnson v. Yates, 183 N.C. 24, 110 S.E.
603 (1922); City Nat'l Bank v. Laughlin, 210 S.W. 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919);
Gardner v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Ark. 464, 184 S.W. 51 (1916); Jesse A. Smith Auto
Co. v. Kaestner, 164 Wis. 205, 159 N.W. 738 (1916); Garr v. Clements, 4 N.D. 559,
62 N.W. 640 (1895). See also 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 33.2 (1965).
" Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
The court decided that because W. VA. CODE ANN. § § 38-11-3, -14 (1966) authorized
the automobile garage to give notice, to advertise, and to sell at auction without
being required to make an affidavit, to arrange bond security, or to institute an
action, the statutory improver's lien violated due process. It is not clear whether
the court held the statutory improver's lien unconstitutional on its face or only
when the court's requirements of affidavit, bond security, and action were not met.
For the purposes of this argument, the statutory improver's lien allowing sale by
auction will be presumed to be unconstitutional on its face.
" State v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959);
State v. Mines, 38 W. Va. 125, 18 S.E. 470 (1893).
[Vol. 79
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is found in the article entitled "Liens and Encumbrances on Vehi-
cles." 3' This article specifically states that its provisions "shall not
be construed so as to require common law mechanic's liens or
repairman's liens, or the lien of an improver or bailee as provided
in . . . [§ 38-11-1 et seq.] . . . to be shown on the certificate of
title in order to preserve such liens ... ."32 This section clearly
demonstrates that the legislature saw the common law repairman's
lien and the statutory improver's lien as separate, definable liens,
and that the statutory improver's lien neither manifested nor sup-
planted the common law.
The official comment to the priority of liens section of the
Uniform Commercial Code33 states that this section was intended
to give the lien of a repairman priority over previously recorded
security interests, whether the repairman's lien be of common law
origin or created by statute. Only when a statutory lien expressly
provides subordination of the repairman's lien is the security inter-
est to have priority. This section, however, is silent about the con-
flict that arises when a common law lien coexists with a statutory
lien expressly subordinate to previously perfected security inter-
ests. This is the situation the court faced in Fruehauf.
In analyzing the cases of the many states which have adopted
§ 9-310 of the Uniform Commercial Code, hereinafter referred to
as the UCC, numerous decisions exist which can be divided into
several categories. First are those jurisdictions in which the com-
mon law lien has priority over previously perfected security inter-
ests through operation of UCC § 9-310 whether a statutory lien
exists or not.34 West Virginia ostensibly falls within this category.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17A-4A-1 et seq. (1974 Replacement Volume).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17A-4A-12 (1974 Replacement Volume). It should be
mentioned that W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17A-4A-5 (1974 Replacement Volume) states
that liens shown upon the certificate of title are to have priority over any other liens
against the vehicle. The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1963,
however, alters that priority as it relates to the common law repairman's lien. The
scope of this UCC article is applicable to § 17A-4A-1 et seq. as a secured transac-
tion. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-102 (1966). Because the Uniform Commercial Code
was enacted subsequent to § 17A-4A-1 et seq., the general repeal provision of the
Uniform Commercial Code invalidates its priority in relation to the common law
repairman's lien. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-10-103 (1966). Therefore, the common law
repairman's lien should retain its priority through the operation of W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46-9-310 (1966).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-310 (1966) (Official Comment).
' Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Howell Bros. Truck and Auto Repair, 325 So. 2d
562 (Ala. 1975); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Serv. and
6
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Second are those jurisdictions where the statutory lien is silent as
to subordination and therefore has priority by operation of UCC §
9-310.15 Third are the jurisdictions whose statutory liens expressly
make themselves subordinate to previously perfected security in-
terests. 6 Last are those jurisdictions which do not apply the code
under these circumstances."
Due to similar legal and factual settings, several cases speak
strongly against the Fruehauf decision. In General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Colwell Diesell Service and Garage, Inc.," the court
ruled that the statutory lien for repairs did not supercede or de-
stroy the common law lien, but merely provided a new and addi-
tional remedy. Therefore, by operation of UCC §9-310, the com-
mon law lien had priority. In a separate case, the Court of Appeals
of Alabama, construing UCC §9-310, recognized that a repairman
claiming a common law lien would have priority over previously
perfected security interests, even though the statutory lien was
expressly subordinate to such interests, if the repairman main-
tained possession of the personal property in question.39
Garage, Inc., 302 A.2d 595 (Me. 1973); Nickell v. Lambrecht, 29 Mich. App. 191,
185 N.W.2d 155 (1970); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. K&G Speed Ass'n, 43 Pa.
D.&C.2d 241 (1967); Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Gibson, 220 Tenn. 654,
422 S.W.2d 435 (1967); Ferrante Equip. Co. v. Foley Mach., 49 N.J. 432, 231 A.2d
208 (1967).
1 Balzer Mach. Co. v. Klineline Sand and Gravel Co., 537 P.2d 321 (Ore.
1975); Gulf Coast State Bank v. Helfs, 525 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1975); Mousel v.
Doenger, 190 Neb. 77, 206 N.W.2d 579 (1973); Charlie Edison's Paint and Body
Shop v. Commercial Credit Plan, Inc., 20 Ind. Dec. 2, 7 UCC Rept. Ser. 256 (1969);
Gables Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., v. First Bank and Trust Co., 219 So. 2d 90 (Fla.
1969); Commerce Acceptance, Inc., v. Press, 428 P.2d 213 (Okla. 1967); Corbin
Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1964).
3' Bond v. Dudly, 244 Ark. 568, 426 S.W.2d 780 (1968); Checkered Flag Motor
Car Co., Inc. v. Grulke, 209 Va. 427, 164 S.E.2d 660 (1968); Pennington v. Alexan-
der, 103 Ill. App. 2d 145, 242 N.E.2d 788 (1968); First Security Bank v. Crose, 374
F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1967) (Colorado law construed); Decker v. Aurora Motors, Inc.,
409 P.2d 603 (Alas. 1966). See note 3 supra.
Municipal Equip. Co. v. Butch and Son Deep Rock, 185 N.W.2d 756 (Iowa
1971); Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Berry, 2 Ohio St. 2d 169, 207 N.E.2d 545 (1965).
11 302 A.2d 595 (Me. 1973). As in Fruehauf, both General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Service and Garage, Inc. and Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Howell Bros. Truck and Auto Repair, 325 So. 2d 562 (Ala. 1975) (see text accompa-
nying note 39) concerned the priority of a perfected security interest and a lien
claimed by a repairman. Both cases dealt with a common law lien and a statutory
lien expressly subordinate.
31 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Howell Bros. Truck and Auto Repair 325 So. 2d
562 (Ala. 1975). However, in this case the repairman released possession of the
[Vol. 79
7
Broadwater: Liens--Priority of Common Law Liens and Secured Interests in West
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976
STUDENT NOTES
Perhaps the decision whose issues are closest to Fruehauf is
Nickell v. Lambrecht,45 wherein the Michigan Court of Appeals
considered the priority of plaintiff's perfected security interest,
which was a title-retaining/conditional sales contract on a tractor,
and defendant's repairman's liens based upon common law and
statute. Although the statutory lien had been held subordinate to
a duly recorded security interest in a previous case,4' the court
decided that the common law lien survived the statutory enact-
ment, stating:
Now at a time well over 50 years after the enactment of
these statutory provisions, we think it a sounder course to follow
the lead of other jurisdictions, which in general have decided
this question in favor of the continued viability of the common
law lien, than ourselves to embark on a futile search for legisla-
tive intention.
1 2
Fruehauf indicates some erosion in the once-favored legal pos-
ition of the laborer. The conservative legislative restructuring of
the mechanic's liens statutes after the court's liberal construction
of the statutes in Carolina Lumber Company v. Cunningham,43
might have made the court anticipate a similar legislative back-
lash if it had held for the continued existence of the common-law
repairman's lien.
Although courts of chancery have commonly held it to be
"clear equity" that a party who has enhanced the value of a chattel
by incorporating therein his labor or material should have a secu-
rity on the improved property,44 there is a far more practical reason
automobile and thus lost his common law lien and its priority.
40 29 Mich. App. 191, 185 N.W.2d 155 (1970).
" Denison v. Shuler, 47 Mich. 598 (1882).
' Nickell v. Lambrecht, 29 Mich. App. 191, 193, 185 N.W.2d 155, 158 (1970).
43 192 S.E.2d 722 (W. Va. 1972). The court stated, "All perfected mechanics'
liens attach at the time of initial construction of the building commenced and take
priority over all other intervening liens created by deeds, or otherwise, that are not
recorded before construction begins." Priority was given to a mechanic who sup-
plied labor and material after the date of construction and after deeds of trust which
were recorded subsequent to the date of construction but prior to the work of the
mechanic. This result is reached because the mechanic's lien was held to attach
from the very first day of construction whether he worked on that day or not. In
1973 the legislature amended the statute, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-1 et seq. (Cum.
Supp. 1975), to provide that a mechanic can claim priority only from the day that
he individually begins work.
11 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Serv. and Garage, Inc.,
302 A.2d 595 (Me. 1973), citing 8 AM. JUR. 2d Bailments § 229 (1970) and 38 AM.
8
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for the continued existence of common law liens. The stated pur-
pose of the Uniform Commercial Code is to simplify, clarify and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions in order to
permit the continued expansion of commercial practices.45 Simply
stated, the code seeks to foster the flow of commerce in our society.
The quantity of litigation in this area shows that this conflicting
lien-security interest situation is a fairly common problem." Under
Fruehauf, a repairman can never be certain that he will be paid
for any work done on vehicles which are under perfected security
interests. Since many newly purchased vehicles are acquired
through credit transactions, Fruehauf means that the repairman,
to insure payment, would have to obtain an agreement from the
creditor before repairs would begin. This is certainly a dam against
the flow of business.4" The bias toward lenders in this decision does
not coincide with the overall interests of commerce.
Considering the rules required for altering the common law,
the past case history of the common law lien, the lack of express
abolition of the common law lien in the statutory improver's lien
statute, and the apparent legislative acknowledgement of the sepa-
rate existence of the common law repairman's lien and the statu-
tory improver's lien, it appears that the court was somewhat hasty
in concluding that the common law repairman's lien no longer
exists. Due to the effects on business that the decision will have,
perhaps it is one that the court should reconsider in the future.
Willard Craig Broadwater
JUR. 2d Garage § 38 (1970).
"5 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1-102 (1966).
"' See notes 32 thru 35 supra.
17 It is somewhat ironic under the circumstances that standard security agree-
ment forms creating security interests usually require the borrower to keep the
chattel in "good repair." This of course protects the security interest in case of
default and forces the borrower to seek out a repairman for the benefit of the
creditor. It is interesting to note that the court in Scott v. Mercer Garage and Auto
Sales Co., 88 W. Va. 92, 106 S.E. 425 (1921), held that a common law repairman's
lien has priority over a previously perfected security interest when the instrument
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